October 7 shattered a great many Israeli preconceptions. The word konseptzia—the “conception”—has haunted Israeli public discourse since the Yom Kippur War, when deeply entrenched assumptions blinded political and military leaders to evidence before their eyes. After October 7, the term returned with a vengeance. Hamas had been deterred. Economic opportunity in Gaza would create an interest in stability. Superior intelligence, air power, sophisticated border defenses, and a small technologically advanced army could manage the threats surrounding Israel. These assumptions, and the policies built upon them, have been subjected to relentless scrutiny ever since.
But the shattered preconceptions were not only military. In the months and years before October 7, Israeli society had become consumed by struggles of extraordinary intensity—over judicial reform, religion and state, constitutional authority, and the basic character of Israel itself. Political opponents increasingly appeared not as fellow citizens with whom one disagreed but as existential threats. Perhaps we had begun to assume that a prosperous and powerful Jewish state could afford endless internal fragmentation: that each community could fortify its own identity without weakening the Jewish whole, and that questions of common responsibility could always be postponed.
October 7 and its aftermath saw these assumptions crumble one by one. The Israelis murdered at Be’eri, Kfar Aza, Ofakim, and Nova were killed as Israelis and Jews; the soldiers who raced south to save them did not first inquire how they had voted. The international reaction supplied another sobering lesson. Responsibility for Jewish existence, we were rudely reminded, cannot be outsourced.
This does not mean a new era of civic harmony is about to emerge. Quite the opposite, as the current election season has demonstrated. Fierce arguments over religion, law, territory, economics, morality, and the nature of public life will continue to rage within a Jewish state. The question is whether those arguments occur within a prior consciousness of a common fate and mission—or whether our narrower identities become so complete that there is no meaningful Jewish “we” beneath them.
Every part of Israeli society therefore must conduct its own reckoning. The same earthquake reaches different buildings differently. This essay concerns how it reaches the Haredim.
Often described as ultra-Orthodoxy in English, haredi Judaism presently exercises immense influence over Israel and the Jewish people, and given its demographic trajectories, that influence is certain to grow. Israel’s haredi population numbered approximately 1.45 million at the end of 2025, around 14.3 percent of the country’s population; close to 60 percent of Haredim are under twenty, and current projections place the community at roughly 16 percent of Israel’s population by 2030. The question of how Haredim understand their relationship with Israel is therefore no longer an internal haredi question. It is one of the great questions concerning Israel’s future.
Nor is that future distant. Haredi conscription is already among the defining questions of Israeli politics. In a September 2026 survey conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute, a party’s position on the issue ranked third among the factors Jewish voters said would most influence their vote, behind only “foreign affairs and security” and “the economy and cost of living.” The same survey found that 68 percent of Jewish respondents regarded the events of October 7 as a central consideration in deciding how to vote. Among Haredim, however, only around one quarter said the same, while 64 percent regarded October 7 as a non-central consideration. The divergence is striking. Most of Jewish Israel is entering this election with October 7 close to the center of its political consciousness, while that is much less the case for the haredi electorate. The question is whether haredi politics can remain untouched by an event that transformed the society in which Haredim live.
Haredim must ask whether assumptions underlying their social and political order were fashioned for conditions that no longer exist: whether a rapidly growing population can continue to understand itself principally as a protected minority; whether the burdens of Jewish sovereignty can indefinitely remain somebody else’s; whether political success can continue to be measured primarily by what we preserve and receive rather than by what we contribute; and whether a society built so successfully around separation can widen its radius of responsibility without sacrificing what the separation was created to protect.
I write from inside haredi society. I live in a haredi Jerusalem neighborhood, and my children were educated and continue to be educated within Israel’s haredi educational system. Yet my primary identity isn’t haredi, but Jewish. This was not always obvious to me. There was a period in which articles in the Hebrew-language haredi daily Yated Ne’eman describing Haredim as the exclusive bearers of the Jewish torch resonated deeply. But this period of my life did not last especially long. It became obvious to me that numerous groups carry the Jewish torch, each imperfectly and each in its own way. More importantly, I have come to believe that our fundamental identity as Jews precedes the narrower communal identities into which Jewish history has divided us.
More than any other consideration, this realization led me to become involved in Hatzibur HaCharedi, the Haredi Public, a new political party running in the present election. I should state plainly that I chair its rabbinic council, and its founder, Moti Leitner, is a friend and former student. The party seeks to preserve the integrity of haredi religious life while confronting questions that concern growing numbers of Haredim: employment, education, youth dropout, military service for those not genuinely engaged in full-time Torah study, and the broader relationship between Haredim and Israeli society.
This essay is not intended as a campaign manifesto, nor will it predict the party’s electoral fortunes. It will instead address the underlying questions: why has this party appeared now, and what are the sociological and political factors behind its emergence? Political parties sometimes reflect little more than personalities or temporary grievances. At other times they are symptoms: institutional expressions of transformations already taking place beneath the surface.
My argument is that October 7 did not create this process. It exposed it, accelerated it, and transformed a long-term haredi dilemma into an immediate Israeli one. To understand those contradictions, we need to begin with one of the towering architects of contemporary haredi society: Rabbi Elazar Menachem Shach, or Rav Shach, as he is known to his followers.
Rav Shach and the Ideology of Separation
Great events rarely manufacture social tendencies from nothing. More often they accelerate tendencies already present. COVID-19 did not invent remote work. By 2020, broadband, cloud computing, video conferencing, laptops, and collaborative software had existed for years. Yet habit, managerial resistance, and a coordination problem kept the practice marginal in many organizations. The pandemic pushed millions across the same threshold simultaneously. Within weeks, what had been technologically possible for years became socially normal. The crisis didn’t plant the seed, but created the conditions in which its sprouts could break through the soil.
I believe October 7 has functioned similarly in haredi society, and to understand how we must go back several decades.
Rabbi Shach (1899–2001), born and educated in the heartland of Jewish Eastern Europe, came to Mandatory Palestine in 1940, and drew his authority from both his reputation as a scholar and his connection to the lost pre-war Jewish world. During his very long life, Shach presided over a period of extraordinary growth and consolidation of the haredi community in Israel. For a period of roughly three decades, he was the rabbi par excellence among its so-called Lithuanian segment (not a geographic designation, but a term for non-hasidic Haredim), although his considerable influence extended into Sephardi and hasidic precincts as well. He exercised an authority difficult to imagine today, and with little precedent. Educational innovations, political initiatives, ideological deviations—all could result in a summons to his office in Bnei Brak. Distinguished rabbinic figures whose teachings or policies were considered insufficiently aligned with the emerging communal consensus were expected to explain themselves.
Rav Shach also transformed the internal balance of haredi politics. The creation of Yated Ne’eman in 1985 and of the Degel HaTorah party in 1988—independent of, but aligned with, the older, hasidic-dominated Agudas Israel—gave the Lithuanian community its own media and political institutions and confirmed his position as the most consequential haredi political leader of his generation.
Yet Rav Shach’s deepest legacy was sociological. He helped shape an unusually comprehensive model of haredi separation. Haredim had, of course, resisted Zionism and secular culture before him. Rabbi Abraham Isaiah Karelitz, known as the Hazon Ish, had articulated a powerful model of withdrawal from secular Israeli society, while the rebuilding of the Torah world after the Holocaust itself demanded intense inward concentration. A devastated remnant believed, with much justification, that every available resource had to be poured into yeshivas, religious schools, families, communal institutions, and the reconstruction of rabbinic authority.
During Rav Shach’s era, however, this developed into something more systematic: not simply ideological opposition to Zionism, but the construction of a distinct society whose institutions, cultural habits, intellectual boundaries, residential patterns, and collective imagination became increasingly separate from those of its Israeli surroundings.
The language employed by the haredi press makes explicit how existential the ideal of separation became. In 1996, when a proposal arose for a common religious electoral front, Yated Ne’eman’s editor Tzvi Friedman warned that separation was the only way to prevent “infected bacteria” from entering the Torah camp. A covenant with the National Religious Party (devoutly Zionist, and, in American terms, Modern Orthodox), he wrote, would blur the unique identity of haredi Judaism and might lead, Heaven forbid, to “the destruction of the remnant of Israel.” The rhetoric is extreme, but it clarifies the logic: separation was not simply a useful sociological tool. It was conceived as a condition of spiritual survival.
The separation became physical through the growth of overwhelmingly haredi neighborhoods and cities; institutional through separate school systems and media; cultural through the cultivation of a self-contained haredi world; and economic through resistance to the universities and, for men especially, prolonged participation in yeshiva and kollel. (The latter institution facilitates open-ended study for married men.) Yated repeatedly described the alternative Israeli sphere not merely as different but as spiritually dangerous. Its annual treatment of Israeli Independence Day was emblematic. In the mainstream haredi view, the celebration dripped with hubris, violating Moses’s warning to the Israelites in Deuteronomy 8, that after experiencing plenitude and security in the Promised Land, they ought not say, “My power and the might of mine hand hath gotten me this wealth.”
Rather than follow the Religious Zionists in dedicating the day to thanking God for the restoration of Israeli sovereignty and the victory over the Arab armies, Haredim saw it as an expression of heresy, and Israeli achievement less as a source of national pride than as a theological temptation.
Rav Shach’s March 1990 address, which has entered Israeli memory as the “rabbits and pigs speech,” exemplified this view. Delivered at Tel Aviv’s Yad Eliyahu stadium, it gained notoriety for its furious criticism of secular kibbutzim, some of which raise non-kosher animals. Yet the most revealing element was not zoological but genealogical. Rav Shach asked what would remain of Jewish identity once Jews severed their connection with Shabbat, the holidays, family tradition, and the inherited forms of Jewish life. His argument, at its core, was not that the secular kibbutznik was morally inferior. It was that a national identity cut loose from the Jewish past could not sustain Jewish continuity. This is not an argument non-haredim should dismiss lightly.
This aspect of Rav Shach’s thought is crucial, because his advocacy of separation from Israel was never indifference to the Jewish people as a whole. It was rooted in a particular understanding of what preserved Jewish existence. The state, sovereignty, territory, and military achievement could not substitute for Torah. Therefore Jewish existence in Israel could still be conceptualized through essentially exilic categories. To Rav Shach, the Jews’ return to their ancestral homeland did not, in itself, have redemptive theological significance. God was to be encountered through Torah and mitzvot rather than through attempts to read divine meaning into contemporary political history.
The most visible manifestation of this ideology was the rise of what the sociologist Menachem Friedman called the “society of learners”: a community in which prolonged full-time Torah study, formerly the path of an intellectual and spiritual elite, became the normative male aspiration. The transformation was enormous. Research indicates that haredi male employment, once broadly comparable to that of the surrounding Jewish population, collapsed during the late 20th century, reaching a low of approximately 35 percent in 2002. It later recovered, but the recovery has stalled: male haredi employment now hovers around 53 percent, while haredi female employment has reached about 81 percent.
The political conditions enabling this development were created largely after Menachem Begin’s electoral victory in 1977. The new government brought the haredi parties into a much more influential position in the coalition, increased support for haredi institutions, and removed previous numerical limits on military deferments for yeshiva students. But political opportunity cannot by itself explain why an entire society embraced the model with such intensity. The ideological energy arose from a deeper project: rebuilding the world of pre-Holocaust Judaism by placing Torah study at the center of male haredi identity and insulating that identity from surrounding Israeli culture.
Here a qualification is important. Rav Shach himself did not regard a military deferment as a license for a young man simply to do nothing, which, in practice, is what it has become for a sizeable number of Haredim. In a 1979 letter, he deployed the formulation Torato umnato, Torah is the yeshiva student’s occupation, the pursuit of which should exempt him from both military service and the normal burden of earning a living. At the same time, he insisted that this formula could only describe someone dedicated to full-time study. Later testimonies and haredi discussions record extraordinarily severe language concerning somebody who exploited the deferment while not actually learning. There is disagreement over whether Rav Shach’s position should be summarized positively as “one who does not learn should enlist” or more narrowly as a prohibition against abusing the status intended for genuine Torah students, but what matters for our purposes is that the exemption was conceived as protection for Torah study, not as an unconditional sectoral privilege.
That distinction highlights one of the most painful problems facing haredi society today: young men who are no longer seriously engaged in Torah study but who neither enlist in the IDF nor acquire the education and skills required for productive employment. Enlistment could be treated as a betrayal of communal identity; seeking employment could expose them to conscription as well as to a world for which their education has left them poorly prepared. A system created to enable Torah study can thereby trap precisely those who are no longer studying.
On the surface, Rav Shach’s legacy appears straightforward: a strong haredi identity substantially detached from the state of Israel; an exilic survival strategy transposed onto sovereign Jewish geography; and an extraordinary concentration of communal resources upon Torah and mitzvot. But this is only half the story.
The Paradox in Rav Shach’s Politics
One of the clearest formulations of the older haredi political conception concerned the role of haredi representatives in the state. They were not supposed to govern Israel in the deep sense of assuming responsibility for its common life. Their role was closer to the traditional Jewish institution of shtadlanut: intercession before the authorities.
The contrast emerged sharply in the 1970 “Who is a Jew?” controversy, when the Lubavitcher rebbe pressed a long-running campaign to amend the Law of Return so that a convert would count as Jewish for purposes of citizenship only if the conversion had been performed according to Orthodox standards. Rav Shach resisted making the question a defining haredi political struggle. The disagreement reflected two opposing instincts. For the rebbe, the legal definition of Jewishness adopted by the Jewish state was intrinsically a religious concern. Rav Shach worried that deep involvement in defining the civic identity of the state risked producing precisely the identification with Israel that the politics of separation sought to avoid.
The philosophy appeared repeatedly in Yated Ne’eman. Haredi participation in government, one editorial explained, was legitimate insofar as it allowed representatives to secure communal needs and defend religious life. Another described haredi politics as “shtadlanut alone,” analogous to the manner in which Jews had stood before rulers throughout the generations, adding that “our present situation is no better than exile among the nations.” When the explicitly anti-haredi Shinui party threatened haredi institutions in the early 2000s, Yated’s editor, Yisrael Spiegel, warned that Haredim might have forgotten “that we have not yet come out of exile.”
The language seems astonishing today. Jews had returned to their homeland from Warsaw, Vilna, Baghdad, Casablanca, and Aleppo, rebuilt Jerusalem, established sovereign institutions, and created the largest Jewish society in the world—and yet the governing metaphor remained the shtadlan approaching a Gentile king or lord. We were physically at home while politically imagining ourselves in exile.
Political practice, however, refused to remain within that framework. Consider the Supreme Court’s 2021 decision concerning non-Orthodox conversions. The Court was determining civil status, not halakhic Jewishness. According to the pure logic of shtadlanut, this should have been the state’s affair. Yet haredi politicians reacted with outrage. Moshe Gafni, one of Degel Hatorah’s leading parliamentarians, spoke of damage to Judaism “in the state of Israel”—a formulation once avoided by haredi leaders—and insisted that Supreme Court justices not be permitted to decide who is Jewish in the Jewish state. Whatever one thinks of the legal question, the political language is revealing. Haredi representatives were no longer speaking merely as representatives of an enclave requesting protection. They were fighting over the Jewish character of Israel itself. Similar examples can be adduced from additional fields: Shabbat desecration, consumption of hametz on Passover in public institutions, the status quo on matters of religion and state, Jewish education in the public education system (shunned by Haredim), and much besides.
But the deeper contradiction emerged from Rav Shach’s own most consequential political decision.
The identification of haredi parties with Israel’s political right now appears almost natural. It was not. Rav Shach was far more willing to entertain territorial concessions than many contemporary haredi voters, and he certainly did not accept Religious Zionist theology. He refused to celebrate or express any joy at Israel’s decisive victory in the Six-Day War. Yet, he brought the Haredim into Menachem Begin’s government after the 1977 election. And during the political crisis of 1990, when Shimon Peres attempted to form a Labor-led government, Rav Shach delivered his Yad Eliyahu address and drew a line against the Israeli left.
His indictment concerned neither economics nor security. It concerned Jewish continuity. The Israeli left, in his account, had severed itself from Jewish tradition and therefore from the sources capable of sustaining Jewish identity.
The irony is profound. Rav Shach directed haredi politics toward the right in order to defend haredi society from secular Israel. But the political camp he chose increasingly understood itself through Jewish nationalism: attachment to Jewish history, the Land of Israel, Jerusalem, national memory, and the idea that Israel is not simply a neutral state populated mainly by Jews but the political home of the Jewish people.
To understand this affinity, it is necessary only to recall that the classic haredi critique of Zionism was not simply anti-nationalist. Jewish tradition contains an irreducibly national dimension. God’s covenant with Abraham concerns descendants and land. Israel receives the Torah as a people preparing to enter a country. Deuteronomy repeatedly addresses the commandments as the basis of collective life in the land. The Tanakh speaks of kings, judges, borders, warfare, agriculture, welfare, taxation, national sin, and national redemption. Never has Judaism fit comfortably into the modern Western category of religion as a private confession detached from peoplehood.
Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner, a supporter of Zionism with impeccable haredi bona fides, could therefore describe the Torah as a “national constitution.” Likewise the German anti-Zionist Rabbi Isaac Breuer did not deny Jewish nationhood; he argued that Jewish nationhood detached from Torah became counterfeit. Rabbi Uriel Zimmer sharpened the point in the late 1950s: Zionism, he argued, had replaced a Jewish identity as defined by the Torah with conventional “national affiliation.” The haredi objection was often less “we are not a nation” than “we are not a nation like the nations.”
This made the emerging Israeli right an increasingly natural political home. The average Likud voter and the average Yated Ne’eman reader still inhabited very different cultural worlds, but they increasingly shared one instinct: Jewish particularity is not an embarrassment to be transcended. Election after election, coalition crisis after coalition crisis, haredi voters learned to see the Israeli right as “our camp.” Questions of terrorism, territory, Jerusalem, judicial power, Jewish identity, and national security became internal haredi political questions. The language of Zionism remained suspect, but the emotional grammar of Jewish nationalism became increasingly natural.
Yated Ne’eman periodically attempted to police the contradiction. As recently as 2022, it insisted that haredi Judaism was “neither right nor left” and that its allegiance was solely to Torah authority. The formal position is coherent. But the rabbis do protest too much, and the repeated insistence on the point tells its own story, one demonstrated by sociological realities.
One cannot spend decades passionately invested in the fortunes of the Jewish state and remain psychologically external to it. Rav Shach chose the right in part to protect Haredim from Israel’s secular culture. The right, paradoxically, helped connect Haredim to Jewish Israel. That paradox matters enormously for what came next.
From Ark to Lighthouse
For many years, the contradiction between separation and participation could remain unresolved because the haredi community was comparatively small. A minority can sustain a politics centered overwhelmingly on its own institutional survival. It can ask for educational autonomy, funding, housing, religious protection, military exemptions, and communal independence without developing a comprehensive theory of the common good. Other citizens may resent the arrangement, but the state can absorb it.
Demography changes the equation. A community comprising more than 14 percent of the population, close to one fifth of schoolchildren, and a still greater proportion of the next generation cannot forever conduct itself as a protected remnant. The question gradually changes from “How will Israel accommodate the Haredim?” to “What kind of Israel will exist as Haredim become a much larger part of the people who sustain it?”
The OECD notes that Haredim constituted approximately 13 percent of Israelis ages 25–29 in 2025 and, under current demographic projections, are expected to comprise 28 percent of that age group by 2060. It concludes that haredi employment and the productivity of haredi workers will become key determinants of Israel’s long-term economic trajectory and fiscal sustainability. Thus the issue cannot be reduced to one enlistment law, one budget, or one election campaign. Israel’s future capacity to finance defense, infrastructure, healthcare, welfare, and education will increasingly depend upon choices made within haredi society, while haredi prosperity will increasingly depend upon the strength of those same national systems.
Thanks to these economic and demographic realities, it is misleading to think that Israel faces a choice between changing its relationship with Haredim and maintaining the status quo. The existing arrangement will not remain the same regardless of the decisions made by the Knesset or the Supreme Court. A model developed for a small minority acquires different consequences when applied to a large one. Inaction, too, produces change.
The older haredi project was born under emergency conditions. European Judaism had been devastated. Entire yeshivas, hasidic courts, rabbinic dynasties, communities, libraries, families, and traditions had been annihilated. The first duty was preservation. The preferred metaphor in the yeshiva world is Noah’s Ark. When the flood rages outside, one does not debate town planning. One seals the vessel, protects what remains alive, and waits for the waters to recede.
That Ark succeeded beyond anything its builders could have imagined. Today Israel is home to a world of Torah study and religious devotion extraordinary in magnitude. Great yeshivas rose from destruction, and more people are studying in them than at any time in Jewish history. Hasidic dynasties that Hitler tried to erase now boast tens of thousands of adherents. Religious books of every kind pour forth from Israeli presses. Children crowd schools and study houses. To the refugees who gathered in Jerusalem and Bnei Brak after the Holocaust, the cultural confidence of contemporary Haredim would be almost unimaginable.
Success itself, however, changes the question. After the flood, Noah is commanded to leave the Ark and reenter the world. Jewish tradition often contrasts Noah with Abraham. Noah survives the destruction of his world; Abraham engages his. While Noah passively accepts God’s decree of destruction, Abraham argues with Him when Sodom is threatened with a similar fate. When his nephew Lot is captured, Abraham goes to war to rescue him. The distinction should not be simplified into praise for one and contempt for the other—Noah faithfully carried out God’s command—but it suggests a useful religious truth. There are periods when faithfulness requires withdrawal, and others in which the same faithfulness demands engagement.
Rabbi Yissachar Shlomo Teichtal wrestled with precisely this problem under circumstances infinitely darker than ours. Raised in the anti-Zionist Hungarian Orthodox milieu, he reconsidered his earlier assumptions during the Holocaust. In his tract Eim HaBanim Semeicha (“A joyful mother of children,” after Psalms 113:9), published in 1943, he asked why devout Jews should leave the rebuilding of the Land almost entirely to secular Zionists. If they really believed the national project should contain greater holiness, he argued, absence could hardly accomplish the purpose.
There is no need to turn Rabbi Teichtal into a retrospective judge of other rabbis or to use the Holocaust as a crude prooftext in a theological dispute. His enduring contribution lay elsewhere. Working entirely within the tradition, he demonstrated that catastrophe can expose assumptions that require reconsideration. Faithfulness does not always mean repeating yesterday’s answer more loudly. Sometimes fidelity to Torah requires asking whether the circumstances for which an answer was formulated have changed.
While Haredim have returned to their homeland and succeeded in rebuilding an extraordinary society devoted to Torah, much of our political imagination remained in exile. Rabbi Teichtal’s question now returns in a new form: if we believe the Jewish collective ought to be shaped by Torah, what follows from withdrawing from responsibility for that collective?
This is the point at which the metaphor of the Ark must give way to another. A lighthouse does not dissolve into the sea. Its efficacy depends precisely upon its solidity. It must be firmly built, rooted in place, and able to withstand a storm. But its purpose is not fulfilled by protecting what lies within. Its light is directed outward.
The movement from Ark to Lighthouse is therefore not a movement from Torah toward Israel, as though Torah were being abandoned in favor of national integration. It is a movement from Torah protected from Israel toward Torah capable of taking responsibility within Israel. It assumes that the walls accomplished something indispensable—and asks what the success of that achievement now demands.
This is also why the political question becomes unavoidable. The established haredi parties were built to operate in the Ark, to protect yeshivas, schools, religious institutions, military exemptions, budgets, and communal autonomy. They performed that task with remarkable effectiveness. But the political machinery constructed to protect a minority from the state does not automatically become the machinery suited to helping a large and growing community assume responsibility within the state.
The distinction becomes concrete in four areas, and in what follows I will outline some general proposals about how to address them.
From Dependence to Economic Capacity
The first is economics and education.
Haredi male employment remains dramatically below that of non-haredi Jewish men. According to the Israel Democracy Institute, 54 percent of haredi men aged 25–66 were employed in 2024, compared with 86.5 percent among non-haredi Jewish men; preliminary 2025 data placed haredi male employment slightly lower still. The earnings gap is even more striking. In 2023, the average monthly earnings of a haredi male employee were approximately 49 percent of those of a non-haredi Jewish male employee.
This is not merely a problem for the Treasury as it calculates tax revenues and healthcare costs while trying to manage the expenses of a prolonged, multifront war. It is a haredi problem of poverty, dignity, dependence, family burden, and human opportunity.
Jewish tradition does not romanticize dependence. The Talmud famously advises a person to “make your Shabbat like a weekday rather than become dependent upon others.” That is, even the obligation to honor the Sabbath by wearing one’s best clothes and eating fine foods shouldn’t override the more basic obligation to provide for oneself. Another teaching states that a child who is self-reliant is considered an adult, while an adult who “eats at his father’s table” is considered a child. Indeed, the talmudic sage Rabbi Yohanan goes so far as to state that a person who enjoys the fruit of his own labor is greater than one who is merely God-fearing. A modern welfare state cannot be designed on the basis of these rabbinic aphorisms, and a decent society rightly supports Torah study, children, the poor, the disabled, and numerous other public goods. But the underlying moral instinct remains significant: independence has dignity, and much of Israeli haredi society has lost that sense of dignity.
Historically, the haredi parties focused on attaining benefits and privileges. How much money could be secured for schools, yeshivas, families, and institutions? Which harmful regulations could be prevented? These were not trivial achievements. An embattled community needed resources to survive.
A Lighthouse politics must add a different question: what capacities are we creating? How many young haredi men possess the tools required to support their families with dignity? Can parents who want serious religious education together with mathematics and English obtain it without being treated as though they have abandoned their own community? Can a young man who discovers that he will not spend his life in full-time Torah study acquire professional skills before he has a wife and several children to support? Can work be understood not as a spiritual failure but as the normal and honorable path of those not destined for lifelong full-time learning?
This is the significance of moving from stipends to opportunity. It does not mean ending support for Torah institutions. It means refusing to confuse support with success. A mature community should measure political achievement not only by the resources it receives but by the human flourishing it enables.
Economic independence has become an internal haredi aspiration rather than merely an external demand.
From Exemption to Responsibility
The second area is military service.
Torah study is a core haredi value. It is not simply an educational requirement, but a lifelong obligation and, moreover, something precious that sustains Judaism and the Jewish people’s connection to God. Nor is it a purely individual matter. For Haredim, there is a communal duty to create and maintain the institutions that can produce outstanding rabbinic scholars, a process that requires years of intensive, full-time study.
When haredi rabbis first negotiated draft exemptions for yeshiva students, their goal was to rebuild those institutions, create new cohorts of elite scholars, and raise a generation that took Torah study seriously. They also understood that the IDF of the early days of statehood was designed to be a melting pot, taking immigrants from radically different cultures and transforming them into Israelis. Sending yeshiva students to the army would be akin to poking holes in the walls of the Ark.
Today, the future of Torah study is nowhere nearly so imperiled as it was in the 1950s. But something more important is at play here: the moral force of the religious claim to draft exemptions rests on the exemptions going exclusively to those genuinely immersed in Torah. More importantly, several leading rabbinic authorities of the late 20th century insisted that the legitimacy of draft exemptions depended upon those exemptions actually serving Torah study. Some used far sharper language, describing a young man who obtained a deferment while not genuinely engaged in full-time learning as a rodef (someone who pursues with intent to kill)—who endangered the legitimacy of the entire system. When Torato umnato ceases to describe a vocation and instead becomes a blanket status granted to anyone born to a haredi family, the claim changes its character.
October 7 made the problem much harder to ignore. Hundreds of thousands of reservists have spent long periods away from families, employment, and normal life. Soldiers have been killed and wounded. Families have carried multiple and immense burdens. Under those circumstances, Moses’s question to the tribes of Gad and Reuben—“Shall your brothers go to war while you sit here?”—acquires an unavoidable resonance.
The verse is not a halakhic ruling about the IDF, but its message is unmistakable. Gad and Reuben wished to settle in the pastureland east of the Jordan, which the Israelites had already conquered, thus relinquishing their claim to the unconquered land of Canaan on the other side of the river. Their leaders were entitled to their distinct tribal interests. What they could not do was separate their fate from that of the nation when it came to carrying the burden of conquest. Moses allows them to claim the land they want, but only after they commit to crossing the Jordan to wage war against the Canaanites alongside their brethren.
Likewise, today’s Haredim can continue to uphold their distinct communal interests, but must ask a different question: how do we preserve genuine Torah study while ensuring that those not engaged in it assume a fair measure of responsibility for Jewish defense?
That question does not trivialize the risks of military integration. The IDF is not a religiously neutral environment, and any serious policy for haredi service must include credible protections for religious standards, family expectations, and the distinct culture from which haredi soldiers arrive. Simply declaring that everybody should enlist solves nothing. Institutions must adapt too.
Translated in policy terms, this means ensuring continued exemptions for full-time Torah students while establishing pathways to military service for those for whom Torah is not in fact a vocation.
The national significance of the issue has also changed. The Bank of Israel has described haredi enlistment since October 7 not merely as a question of social equality but as a defense and macroeconomic issue because of the expanded burden placed on reservists. Its 2025 analysis estimated that a substantial increase in regular haredi enlistment could reduce both reserve service and its economic cost. The debate that was once largely about the relationship between yeshiva students and the state now touches the structure of Israel’s military manpower and economy.
This position also reconnects the contemporary debate with something important in Rav Shach’s own legacy. Whatever the precise implications of his comments on enlistment, he did not understand the yeshiva exemption as a metaphysical entitlement attached to every haredi male irrespective of whether he learned. It existed for Torah. That distinction is now impossible to avoid.
From Shtadlanut to Responsible Power
The third area concerns political institutions themselves.
The traditional shtadlan was weak. He did not govern. He pleaded before the ruler. His responsibility was consequently narrow: protect the Jews, mitigate decrees, secure permission for religious life, obtain resources where possible. He didn’t advocate a certain monetary policy or express opinions about foreign affairs. The contemporary haredi politician inhabits a radically different world. Today Haredim chair Knesset committees, administer municipalities, control ministries, negotiate national budgets, and sometimes participate in decisions involving security, health, housing, transportation, and the national economy.
One cannot exercise power like a sovereign while imagining oneself a petitioner.
The Torah’s approach to the monarchy is instructive. Political authority is not condemned, but neither is it sanctified. The king must keep a Torah scroll with him so that “his heart not be lifted above his brothers” (Deuteronomy 17:20). Power requires greater humility precisely because it so easily persuades its bearer that his interests are synonymous with the good.
Here the involvement of rabbinic authority in haredi politics can generate an unintended danger. Rabbinic oversight was intended to make politics subordinate to Torah. Yet religious language can sometimes reverse the relationship, granting ordinary political machinery an aura of sanctity. A party becomes “the Torah party”; a coalition tactic becomes Torah itself; loyalty to politicians is framed as loyalty to the sages; criticism of institutional conduct begins to sound like criticism of religion.
But the political mechanism is not holy. Torah is holy. The Jewish people are holy. Serious Torah study is precious. A party is an instrument.
That distinction is essential both for accountability and for kiddush Hashem, the religious imperative to affirm the sanctity of God’s name through one’s deeds. Haredi political loyalty has often been experienced internally as a public declaration that Torah survived secular modernity, which makes sense on its own terms. But kiddush Hashem has always been understood as acting in such a way that leads others to praise God and those who follow His Torah. All too often, haredi political behavior has had the opposite effect.
When fellow Jews increasingly associate haredi politics with avoidance of common burdens, economic dependence, corruption, or indifference to soldiers, it is not enough to dismiss every criticism as an expression of bigotry. Much anti-haredi discourse is indeed crude, selective, and unfair. But a religious community has an obligation to distinguish prejudice from criticism and criticism from truth.
The Lighthouse does not require haredi politicians to become less assertive. A large community has legitimate interests. Torah education, religious autonomy, Shabbat, family life, and the institutions of Torah all require vigorous protection. But haredi politics must shift from the single-minded defense of sectoral interests to the responsible use of power: from asking only what government can provide for us to asking how our exercise of power affects the Jewish public whose state we play an increasingly large role in governing.
From “Them and Us” to a Jewish “We”
The fourth arena is the relationship with Israeli society itself.
Here October 7 matters in a way that goes beyond military service. The massacre and the war that followed awakened a common Jewish identity across sectors. Haredim volunteered; ZAKA workers, who collect even the smallest fragments of dead bodies to fulfill religious burial requirements, entered scenes of unimaginable horror; food and equipment poured from haredi communities to soldiers and displaced families; rabbis visited bases; haredi soldiers fought. At the same time, other parts of Israeli society reached visibly toward Jewish language and ritual. There was a widespread phenomenon of theretofore secular young people donning tsitsit (ritual fringes), praying, singing songs of faith, and otherwise engaging in religious practices—and reaching for the Tanakh and the vocabulary of Jewish destiny.
These developments should not be romanticized or exaggerated. Israeli society remains deeply divided, and the religious awakening since October 7 takes many forms, often far removed from Orthodoxy. Yet it strengthens a process that was visible long before the war. Haredim have become more integrated into Israeli life, while Israeli Jewish identity has become less comfortably secular in the old ideological sense. The distance has narrowed from both directions.
October 7 transformed this gradual convergence into something more emotionally immediate. The categories “them” and “us” became harder to sustain when “their” soldiers were dying to protect “our” families, while haredi volunteers were tending “their” dead and caring for “their” displaced children. The Jewish relationship beneath the social categories became visible.
Precisely at that moment, the old fear of closeness also reappeared. In November 2023, Yated’s weekly magazine attacked the wartime slogan B’yahad n’natzeah—“Together we will win”—calling it “one big lie” and warning that appeals to unity could become a vehicle for drawing Haredim into secular Israeli society.
The editorial is revealing because it states the fear with unusual clarity. If the haredi model depends upon a firm boundary between “them” and “us,” even expressions of fraternity can appear dangerous. Yet October 7 demonstrated that the boundary is not an unbridgeable chasm. We may possess different institutions, values, clothing, educational structures, and ways of life, but we also share a common Jewish fate. Theodor Herzl described something similar in his short story “The Menorah,” published only months after the First Zionist Congress. His protagonist, an assimilated Jew who had ceased to concern himself with his Jewish origins, rediscovers them when the age-old hatred returns under a new guise. Rabbi Abraham Elijah Kaplan later described Herzl’s historical achievement with the biblical declaration Ivri anokhi: I am a Jew (Jonah 1:9).
The point is not that anti-Semitism creates Jewish identity, or that Jews require enemies in order to remember who they are. It is that moments of danger can strip away identities that seemed absolute and reveal a belonging that preceded them. Something of that happened after October 7. Israelis who had spent years describing themselves principally as secular or religious, right or left, Mizrahi or Ashkenazi, haredi or non-haredi, found themselves confronted with a simpler and more primordial fact: they are Jews.
I am a card-carrying haredi. But first and foremost, I am a Jew, and then a Haredi. Haredi identity is not unimportant; it defines an enormous amount about my religious and communal life. But haredi is an adjective. Jew is the noun. The order matters because identity determines the radius of responsibility.
As I have written elsewhere, Haredim must move from understanding their relationship with the state as a contract to understanding it as a covenant. A contract asks what I receive in exchange for what I contribute. Jewish peoplehood involves something thicker: a relationship in which shared belonging itself creates duties. Judaism is based on a covenant rather than a contract. In this context, this means that a Jewish “we” must precede the haredi sector’s political bargaining with the government.
This is also where the talmudic dichotomy between Yavneh and Jerusalem remains useful. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai’s famous request to the soon-to-be emperor Vespasian—“Give me Yavneh and its sages”—was one of the great acts of Jewish statesmanship. By realizing that Jerusalem was already lost, ben Zakkai sought to save the rabbinic academy in the city of Yavneh in order to preserve and continue the transmission of Jewish civilizational knowledge. While the Romans destroyed the Temple and razed Jerusalem, he rescued the seeds from which Judaism could grow once more. Postwar haredi Judaism accomplished something comparable amid the catastrophe of the Holocaust. It built Yavneh magnificently.
But Yavneh was never the ultimate Jewish destination. Ben Zakkai acted out of his faith that one day the Temple would be rebuilt and Jewish sovereignty restored. The paradox of contemporary haredi life is that we built Yavneh while living in Jerusalem. We developed the political psychology of exile inside Jewish sovereignty. That was understandable when we were a frightened remnant. It becomes increasingly difficult once we are ministers, mayors, physicians, entrepreneurs, legislators, soldiers, and a rapidly growing share of the Jewish population.
Israel’s economy is our economy. Its hospitals are our hospitals. Its wars reach our children. Its public debt will be paid by them. Its Jewish identity is not somebody else’s problem.
This, finally, is what it means for the Ark to become a Lighthouse.
The New Haredi Politics
At this point the emergence of a new haredi party becomes easier to understand.
The question is not whether haredi society has suddenly become Zionist, modern, liberal, or rebellious. It has not. Traditional haredi institutions remain enormously powerful. Most Haredim remain deeply religious and socially conservative. The yeshiva continues to enjoy extraordinary prestige. Rabbinic authority remains central. The new sociological reality consists not in the disappearance of haredi identity but in the multiplication of haredi lives that no longer fit comfortably within the old political model.
There are working yeshiva graduates, businesspeople, haredi academics, soldiers and veterans, immigrants from the Diaspora who want and expect both intensive religious life and natural Israeli belonging, parents who want stronger general education for their children, women whose professional roles have expanded dramatically, and young people who wish to enter the workforce without being seen as having left their community. These people are not necessarily asking to stop being haredi. Instead, they are asking for a haredi society capacious enough to include them.
Embedded within this development is a subtle political shift. The established haredi parties were built principally around institutions: hasidic courts, yeshiva leadership, rabbinic establishments, school systems, communal hierarchies. Their political achievements have consequently been measured largely through the fortunes of those institutions. The emerging constituency is not anti-institutional, but wants the haredi public to be part of the political conversation heretofore dominated by rabbis, political activists, parties, schools, and yeshivas—the family trying to achieve economic stability, the parent making an educational choice, the working yeshiva graduate, the soldier, the immigrant, the young person looking for a viable place inside the community.
This distinction should not be exaggerated. Haredi society cannot be understood through a liberal model of atomized individuals detached from communal institutions; nor would most of its members want it to be. But a community does not automatically receive political representation merely because its institutions are represented. That tension has become more visible.
The pressure has now increased from several directions simultaneously. Demography makes economic and educational questions harder to postpone. The conscription crisis makes the distinction between genuine Torah students and everybody else increasingly unavoidable. With haredi politicians possessing more power than ever before at the national level, the language of pure shtadlanut becomes increasingly implausible. October 7 made the question of Jewish solidarity immediate and personal. And the election is placing all these pressures into a single political contest.
The appearance of several new haredi political initiatives in the present election cycle is therefore notable not because they are identical—they are not—but because they have emerged at the same historical moment. Political entrepreneurs may differ sharply about diagnosis and solution; their simultaneity nevertheless suggests a representational structure under pressure.
HaTzibur HaCharedi is one such attempt. Its particular argument is that haredi distinctiveness can be preserved while the community moves toward greater economic independence, differentiates genuine full-time Torah learning from non-learning young men on the question of military service, expands educational options, and accepts a broader measure of responsibility for Israel’s future.
Whether voters accept this proposition is an electoral question that cannot be answered in advance. The historical question is larger. A political structure designed primarily to guard the Ark will inevitably face pressure once significant parts of the public believe that the central task has changed.
This is why the new party cannot be understood merely as an anti-establishment protest. The deeper question is what haredi politics are for. If the primary goal remains protection from Israel, then the existing grammar makes sense: preserve institutional autonomy, maximize communal resources, defend exemptions, prevent unwanted cultural penetration.
If the task has become the development of a Lighthouse, politics acquires another function. It must help Haredim enter economic life with dignity rather than stigma; create educational pathways appropriate to different haredi futures; distinguish the protection of Torah from blanket sectoral privilege; cultivate forms of service compatible with religious life; hold haredi representatives accountable for the use of public power; and bring Torah thinking into questions whose scope extends far beyond the haredi neighborhood.
The choice, moreover, is not between change and a stable status quo. Under the pressure of demographics, war, economics, and greater haredi political power, that status quo is already collapsing. The question is whether this change will be shaped consciously or whether it will occur through repeated crises between a growing community and the surrounding society. That is the challenge that lies before Haredim today.
Rav Shach and the Seeds of Change
All of this brings us back to Rav Shach.
Around twenty years ago, a member of Rav Shach’s family told me about a conversation he had with the venerable sage not long before he withdrew from active public leadership. He raised an argument that has since become familiar. The “society of learners,” he said, could not continue indefinitely in its existing form. Making prolonged full-time Torah study the default expectation for the great majority of men was historically radical. The model created poverty and dependence, placed enormous breadwinning responsibility on women, and would become increasingly difficult to sustain as Haredim became a much larger share of Israeli society.
“When,” he asked Rav Shach, “will things go back to normal?”
Rav Shach’s answer was simple: “After my one hundred and twenty” (the age reached by Moses being the proverbial extent of a person’s lifetime). After his death, he explained, haredi society would gradually return to a more traditional structure in which most men worked and an outstanding minority remained immersed in Torah and became the next generation's scholars and rabbinic leaders.
“But how will it happen?” his relative pressed. “Everybody will say that Rav Shach established this system. Who will be able to go against the word of Rav Shach?”
Rav Shach began listing figures who might possess sufficient authority to initiate the change. One after another, he rejected them. These were men who would indeed become the recognized religious leadership of the next generation. Finally, he conceded that he did not know who would do it.
“That is not my responsibility,” he concluded. “Somebody in the next generations will arise and make sure it happens.”
The account is a private recollection rather than a published ruling, and it should be treated accordingly. Yet it captures something profound about the historical problem. A system constructed under charismatic authority cannot necessarily be reformed by the same kind of authority. Once a particular social model becomes identified with obedience to the sages, a later rabbi attempting to alter it risks being accused of contradicting the sacred legacy he inherited.
Change therefore comes differently. One family sends a son to professional training. Another chooses a school with stronger general studies. A young man who has ceased serious Torah study enters the military. An entrepreneur creates a workplace in which Haredim can remain haredi. A rabbi quietly legitimizes a path without proclaiming a revolution. Thousands of decisions accumulate until what once looked like individual deviation becomes a recognizable social current. No policy change or new political party can initiate such changes. But eventually, politics will catch up.
And here the historical irony becomes complete. Rav Shach is remembered above all as an architect of haredi separation, and there is a current within contemporary haredi society that seeks to preserve precisely this dimension of his legacy with almost no concession to changed circumstances. The group known as the Jerusalem Faction represents the most uncompromising version of this approach. Its familiar slogan, “We will die rather than enlist,” expresses more than opposition to a particular conscription policy. Beneath the rhetoric lies an existential fear: if haredi men enter the army, universities, professional workplaces, and the institutions of Israeli life, what will remain of the edifice of separation that Rav Shach labored to construct? From this perspective, the walls themselves become the inheritance, and every breach in them threatens the whole.
The resulting politics is correspondingly militant. Jerusalem Faction protests have repeatedly involved road blockages, confrontations with police, harassment of haredi recruits and, at times, violence. In late September 2026, thousands marched in Jerusalem to welcome draft evaders released from military prison, carrying signs that described the IDF as “the enemy army” and proclaimed “we will die rather than enlist.” The event drew sharp political condemnation, but the public criticism reported in its immediate aftermath came overwhelmingly from outside the mainstream Haredi leadership. The Jerusalem Faction has now also entered the national electoral arena through its own independent list, Tzeva Shahor (“Color Black”), an attempt to translate this uncompromising stance into an independent political force.
Yet for all its highly visible street presence, the Jerusalem Faction remains a minority current within haredi society. That fact is important. Its claim to Rav Shach’s mantle rests upon one unmistakable element of his legacy—the imperative of separation—but risks mistaking that element for the legacy as a whole. For two other dimensions of what Rav Shach built point, paradoxically, beyond the political model most closely associated with his name.
The first is the astonishing success of the society he helped build. Precisely because the Ark succeeded, it outgrew the circumstances of emergency for which it was constructed. A small remnant can orient its entire public existence around survival. A community approaching 1.5 million members cannot. Success breeds responsibility.
The larger and more powerful haredi society becomes, the less sustainable is its demand that the surrounding society continue carrying burdens from which Haredim seek categorical exemption. Public frustration over military service, economic participation, education, and political power is already intense. If a growing haredi population is perceived as claiming an ever-larger share of national influence while refusing a corresponding share of national responsibility, the relationship between Haredim and the rest of Israeli society will become increasingly adversarial. Such a development would be disastrous not only for Israel but for the very world Rav Shach devoted his life to building. The attempt to freeze his achievements in time could, paradoxically, lead to their collapse.
The second dimension of Rav Shach’s legacy is his embrace of political alignment with the Israeli right. By directing haredi politics toward the camp that increasingly embraced the language of Jewish nationalism, he helped create the conditions for haredi identification with Israel itself. Whatever one thinks of this development, it is now a social fact that cannot simply be wished away.
The contradiction cannot be solved by rhetoric. One cannot teach a population for decades that the Jewish character of Israel matters, enlist it politically in battles over that character, encourage it to identify emotionally with the Jewish-national camp, and then expect it indefinitely to regard Israel as a foreign entity toward which its obligations are mainly transactional.
Perhaps Rav Shach understood, at least privately, that the structure he had built for an extraordinary historical moment could never become permanent. Perhaps he trusted that another generation would discover how to preserve what needed preservation while restoring a more sustainable balance.
The Ark saved something precious. Those who built it had seen what happened when Jewish communities lowered their defenses before the ideological storms of modern Europe. Their fear was not imaginary, and their achievement should not be spoken of lightly. But, as for Noah and his family, there is a time for them to emerge.
I cannot in good faith say that I am optimistic. Optimism is an expectation that things will turn out well. Rather, what I have is hope. Hope is the conviction that, even if the outcome remains uncertain, our actions can make a difference for the better.
The electoral prospects of HaTzibur HaCharedi are uncertain, and even if it wins a few seats in the Knesset, that proves very little by itself. But the election concentrates the mind on questions that will remain after the ballots are counted. Haredi conscription is already one of the central issues shaping Jewish voters’ choices. Economic participation has become a long-term national challenge identified by bodies far removed from partisan politics. What once might have been postponed as a matter for another generation is steadily becoming part of Israel’s present tense.
How many haredi men can remain economically dependent in a community of growing demographic weight? How can genuine Torah study be maintained without transforming its privileges into a blanket sectoral entitlement? What form of military or national responsibility should be expected of those not engaged in full-time study? How should haredi political power be exercised when Haredim are no longer merely petitioners but participants in government? What kind of education allows a child to grow into an uncompromising Torah Jew while possessing the tools necessary for adult independence? And what can haredi Judaism offer an Israeli Jewish society that is itself searching, in new ways, for meaning, tradition, and Jewish identity?
These are not questions imposed upon haredi society from outside. They arise from its own success.
The generation that emerged from the Holocaust did not know whether Judaism as they knew it would survive. We do. They rebuilt yeshivas, schools, communities, and families from ruins. We inherit institutions bursting at the seams. Now that the Torah has endured the traumas and upheavals of the 20th century, my generation must ask what responsibilities we have in the society within which God has placed us.
The achievements of our grandfathers should give us confidence. A community that knows what it stands for need not choose between dissolving into surrounding society and hiding indefinitely from it. It can preserve thick boundaries where they protect religious life while refusing to use those boundaries as an excuse for disengagement. It can insist that the sovereignty of any human state remains subordinate to the Sovereign of the Universe while accepting responsibility for the state in which the Jewish people now live.
And that question no longer belongs to Haredim alone. The choices made by a community that is young, rapidly growing, politically powerful, and central to the Jewish character of Israel will help shape the army Israel fields, the economy it sustains, the education it provides, the civil Torah it develops, and the relationship among the different parts of the Jewish people. The future of haredi society and the future of Israel are no longer parallel stories, if they ever were. Increasingly, they are a single story.
The 2026 election will not settle that story. It may, however, mark a moment when its central question becomes impossible to avoid. The Ark was necessary. It worked. The door is now open. The question is what kind of light we will carry out of it.