“Avoid ‘Zionism.’”
That was the advice on a slide at a retreat for the Jewish Federations of North America’s National Young Leadership Cabinet. The advice is not hard to understand. JFNA’s own polling found that 88 percent of American Jews said Israel has the right to exist as a Jewish, democratic state, while only 37 percent identified as Zionists. When support for that proposition is so much broader than identification with the word that names it, it is easy to see why an institution would want to avoid the term in order to keep people in the conversation.
But when an image of the slide was shared online, it caused an uproar, and JFNA quickly ended its relationship with the consultant involved, saying the slide did not represent its approach to Zionism. I believe them. Reluctance to use the word Zionist is not the same thing as wanting Jewish institutions to retreat from Zionism. In the same poll, only 7 percent called themselves anti-Zionist, suggesting a substantial gap between what people are willing to call themselves and what they actually believe. But interpreting the data is not the same as knowing where Jewish life is headed.
Behind this soon-to-be-forgotten scandal lie deeper and more substantive questions about the condition of American Jewish institutions. For decades, our communal organizations at the local and national levels have focused almost single-mindedly on retention: how to raise children who will remain Jews, how to keep the younger generation from defecting, how to curb intermarriage, how to keep children of intermarriage Jewish, how to get people who stopped going to synagogue to come back, and how to reach out to those who never went in the first place. The people we fear losing are the sun around which our communal endeavors revolve. This attitude betrays an older fear, inherited from countless generations before us: that losing Jews is not merely a numerical problem, but evidence that the Jewish future itself is disappearing. So we watch the people moving furthest away from the community and treat them as though they are showing us where Jewish life as a whole is headed. And when we build around that forecast, we start changing what we offer everyone else in order to keep in the fold the people most likely to leave.
This instinct increasingly shapes how our institutions respond to anti-Zionist Jews. A recent online guide to anti-Zionist Jewish organizations, communities, and projects expressed the hope that they might one day help “replace the mainstream Zionist Jewish establishment.” At first glance, this compilation can look like evidence that a new anti-Zionist Jewish ecosystem is taking shape.
Some of it is real. There are organizations and communities with people, money, and infrastructure behind them. But the directory also includes Facebook groups, podcasts, a Palestinian wool initiative, and a queer-centered ritual-candle project. It is a far cry from an institutional infrastructure that can sustain robust Jewish life. These projects are defined by what they reject, not by a common vision for how Jewish life should actually be built.
Yet it would be a mistake to underestimate them. As I was finishing this essay, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported on a “bootcamp” in Brooklyn for people starting anti-Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish groups, under the headline “They want Jewish life without Zionism. Now they’re building the institutions to match.” More than a hundred people came to sessions on staffing, funding, political boundaries, and how to make mostly volunteer-run groups more durable. Many represented minyanim and havurot (small, semiformal prayer groups); some considered camps, educational programs, and eventually permanent spaces. One minyan mentioned in the piece draws about 50 people on Shabbat. All this amounts to the existence of something too substantive to be ignored, but nothing like a major demographic trend.
Some contemporary anti-Zionists have evoked the legacy of the Bund, the Yiddishist socialist movement that was one of Zionism’s major competitors in Eastern Europe until its destruction by Hitler and Stalin. If they want to understand themselves as its heirs—fair enough. But that inheritance includes more than opposition to Zionism. The Bund built a dense Jewish world of trade unions, newspapers, schools, and political organizations, along with a youth movement and a party represented in the Polish parliament. If you want to claim that lineage, you have to claim that seriousness too. And even if today’s neo-Bundists build something similarly substantial and lasting, they are doing so in a radically different world. The Bund made its defining argument before Jewish sovereignty existed. Any Jewish future built outside Israel today is being built alongside a sovereign Jewish society that is already a fact.
Why, then, do we keep treating their rejection of Israel as a forecast for Jewish life as a whole?
Part of the answer is much older than Zionism. In his 1948 essay “Israel: The Ever-Dying People,” the American Jewish Hebraist and writer Simon Rawidowicz traced this fear from Abraham’s dread of dying childless through generation after generation of Jews convinced they might be the last. We have been afraid of being the last Jews for a very long time.
Sovereignty did not make that fear irrelevant. After the destruction of European Jewry, with Israel young and precarious, fear that the Jews might disappear was firmly grounded in reality. In other words, Jews had become accustomed to staring into the abyss—and mistaking it for the horizon. But sovereignty changed the stakes. It made organizing our institutions around that fear a choice rather than a necessity.
An American Jew can walk away from mainstream Jewish life today without taking the Jewish future with her. We may want her back, argue with her, or think she is wrong. What we do not have to do is reshape Jewish life around the possibility that she might leave.
But that fear did not attach itself to Zionism by accident. After 1967, Israel moved to the center of organized American Jewish life. As the main denominations became less able to hold American Jews together, support for Israel took on more of that role. You could be an atheist and rarely enter a synagogue but still be a committed, engaged Jew if Israel mattered deeply to you. Israel became one of the few things Jewish institutions could still count on people sharing, even as they shared less of everything else.
That is part of what made the Birthright program so important. Beginning in 1999, it brought nearly a million young Jews, many with little connection to organized Jewish life, into direct encounter with Israel. Over the next quarter century, Israel gave many American Jews a powerful sense of being part of a Jewish story even when their Jewish lives at home did not ask very much of them. The thickness of Jewish life in Israel could compensate, at least for a time, for some of the thinning of Jewish life in America.
But Israel could only do so much. A serious encounter with Israel can change a life; it cannot build the Jewish life that person comes home to. Once Israel itself became a source of alienation for some Jews, rejection of Zionism could look like something more than disagreement over one part of Jewish life. It could look like rejection of one of the few things still holding people together.
None of this makes Birthright or similar initiatives—RootOne, Honeymoon Israel, Momentum—misguided. To the contrary, they understand something important: Israel can give Jews an encounter with Jewish peoplehood that is difficult to reproduce anywhere else, offering a sense of a rich, public, shared Jewish life to people for whom being Jewish has never been any of these things.
Those encounters required heroic efforts of fundraising and organization. But an encounter, however powerful, is by definition only a momentary experience. The harder work is the Jewish life people come home to: the ordinary, repeated life of community, ritual, learning, argument, friendship and obligation. We have become very good at creating peak moments. Building a Jewish life substantial enough to hold people between them is much harder.
These tasks of institution building become harder still when we organize them around the person most likely to leave, because over time the institution starts changing what it is willing to say, to teach, and to offer. Controversies over Zionism only highlight this problem. Long before October 7, many younger Jews were already pushing against the central place Israel holds in organized Jewish life.
If Israel has carried so much of the weight of Jewish belonging, it is easy for an institution to read a young Jew’s rejection of Zionism as a rejection of Jewish community itself. Then the old retention instinct takes over. If Jews recoil from the word “Zionism,” why let vocabulary get in the way? Find language they will listen to, lower the barrier, and keep the conversation going.
I understand the impulse. I use different language with different audiences too. But follow that instinct far enough and the effort to keep people from leaving starts to reshape the Jewish life being offered to everyone else. Keep removing whatever might alienate someone at the edge and eventually you have hollowed out the very thing you were trying to invite them into.
That is what bothers me about the instruction to “avoid Zionism.” If an institution has concluded that Zionism is wrong, then it should change what it teaches. But if it still believes in Jewish sovereignty, it should be able to say so. Allowing the possibility of rejection to determine in advance what everyone else is allowed to say makes no sense.
Here Jewish institutions would do well to reflect on the approach taken by Lubavitch Hasidim. The doors of a Chabad house are almost absurdly easy to walk through, but nobody entering could mistake that accessibility for uncertainty about what Chabad believes or what kind of Jewish life it is offering. There is Torah, ritual, practice, an explicitly Jewish vocabulary, and a clear sense of purpose. For people looking for something thicker than what they are finding elsewhere, that clarity has real power.
Chabad is hardly indifferent to engagement. If anything, it is relentless about it. The difference is that it does not seem to believe engagement requires dilution. I’m not arguing that pluralistic or non-Orthodox institutions need to become clones of Chabad. Rather, they need to stop assuming that welcoming people requires becoming less clear about what they are being welcomed into. And when mainstream institutions become less clear about what they are offering, they should not be surprised when Jews looking for something more substantial find it somewhere else, often at Chabad. We should try emulating Chabad’s self-confidence.
In Europe a century ago, Zionists, Communists, Bundists, Diaspora nationalists, and staunch religious traditionalists had lively and fierce debates over the merits of Zionism and about where the future of the Jewish people would take place. But the terms of those debates have changed. A Jewish state exists, and nearly half of the world’s Jews live there, regardless of what their American brethren think about it. We can argue endlessly about Israel, what it does, and what our relationship to it should be. But the question is no longer whether Jewish life will be built there. It is what that fact means for the Jewish life we build here.
Part of what keeps us so focused on the anti-Zionist edge is the suspicion that the people there are simply ahead of everyone else. Maybe they are. But that has to be demonstrated, not assumed. Their behavior and opinions aren’t some kind of prophecy.
The task before mainstream Jewish institutions is not to care less about the Jews who leave, or to make Israel smaller in our communal lives; it is to stop allowing the possibility of their departure to set the terms for everyone else. Jewish sovereignty should make us more confident about what we build here, not more tentative. Israel should be woven deeply enough into that life that it that it does not have to serve as the be all and all of Jewish existence.
Here I am reminded of a story about the third Lubavitcher rebbe, Menachem Mendel Schneersohn (1789–1866)—known to his followers as the Tzemakh Tzedek. A Hasid once came to him to ask if he should move to the Land of Israel. The rebbe reportedly answered, makh doh Eretz Yisroel: make the Land of Israel here.
I have always loved that formulation because Eretz Yisrael stays in the sentence. The rebbe tells him to build Jewish life here without pretending that “here” is all there is. Israel’s existence does not relieve us of the task of building a serious Jewish life here, and it does not require us to make Israel the entire content of that life. It requires knowing what we are trying to build here, welcoming people into it, and accepting that not everyone will stay.
Jews spent generations longing to return and rebuild there. Now that we have, how could it not change what we build everywhere else?