
January 23, 2025
Not postmodern fantasies, but a failure to preempt Hamas and Hizballah led to Israel’s current security crisis.
I only reached the rank of lance corporal in the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire light infantry and my British army combat experience was limited to the trivial North Borneo campaign. In Israel I only had a local-defense Mauser 98 rifle in the finger of Galilee in 1967, was a mere passenger in a captured Soviet BTR armored personal carrier that crossed the Suez Canal in 1973, and in 1982 was a mere tourist with Generals Avigdor Ben-Gal and Yossi Ben-Hanan and Major Meir Dagan (the future head of the Mossad) in the 1982 jaunt to Byblos/Jbeil 40 kilometers north of Beirut and beyond to the Syrian line (Ben-Hanan was furious when I called it a raid). Thus I lack the credentials to contest Ran Baratz’s all-out condemnation of the past several IDF chiefs of staff. I want only to note that instead of the usual accusation that these generals have tried to refight the last war, Baratz condemns them for wanting to fight a future post-modern war.
Nor do I have any documents to disprove his contentions, having gathered none in my three visits to Israel since October 7, during which I only chit-chatted with staff officers and saw only one very minor combat action involving just three M109 self-propelled howitzers supporting infantry combat—as well as a single F-16 strike, and that too only coincidentally.
But of course I do know that the IDF entered the war with fewer reserve brigades than in the past, and too few for concurrent all-out action in both Gaza and Lebanon, because the generals he mentions failed to resist the force reductions by threatening to resign in public protest, let alone actually resigning. But I do challenge the accusation that they failed to resign because they were hypnotized by postmodern fantasies as Ran Baratz would have it. There was another motive: they wanted to acquire some other capabilities for the IDF.

January 23, 2025
Not postmodern fantasies, but a failure to preempt Hamas and Hizballah led to Israel’s current security crisis.
I only reached the rank of lance corporal in the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire light infantry and my British army combat experience was limited to the trivial North Borneo campaign. In Israel I only had a local-defense Mauser 98 rifle in the finger of Galilee in 1967, was a mere passenger in a captured Soviet BTR armored personal carrier that crossed the Suez Canal in 1973, and in 1982 was a mere tourist with Generals Avigdor Ben-Gal and Yossi Ben-Hanan and Major Meir Dagan (the future head of the Mossad) in the 1982 jaunt to Byblos/Jbeil 40 kilometers north of Beirut and beyond to the Syrian line (Ben-Hanan was furious when I called it a raid). Thus I lack the credentials to contest Ran Baratz’s all-out condemnation of the past several IDF chiefs of staff. I want only to note that instead of the usual accusation that these generals have tried to refight the last war, Baratz condemns them for wanting to fight a future post-modern war.
Nor do I have any documents to disprove his contentions, having gathered none in my three visits to Israel since October 7, during which I only chit-chatted with staff officers and saw only one very minor combat action involving just three M109 self-propelled howitzers supporting infantry combat—as well as a single F-16 strike, and that too only coincidentally.
But of course I do know that the IDF entered the war with fewer reserve brigades than in the past, and too few for concurrent all-out action in both Gaza and Lebanon, because the generals he mentions failed to resist the force reductions by threatening to resign in public protest, let alone actually resigning. But I do challenge the accusation that they failed to resign because they were hypnotized by postmodern fantasies as Ran Baratz would have it. There was another motive: they wanted to acquire some other capabilities for the IDF.

January 2025

January 2025

January 2025

January 2025

January 2025

January 2025

January 2025

January 2025
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Subscribe NowI only reached the rank of lance corporal in the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire light infantry and my British army combat experience was limited to the trivial North Borneo campaign. In Israel I only had a local-defense Mauser 98 rifle in the finger of Galilee in 1967, was a mere passenger in a captured Soviet BTR armored personal carrier that crossed the Suez Canal in 1973, and in 1982 was a mere tourist with Generals Avigdor Ben-Gal and Yossi Ben-Hanan and Major Meir Dagan (the future head of the Mossad) in the 1982 jaunt to Byblos/Jbeil 40 kilometers north of Beirut and beyond to the Syrian line (Ben-Hanan was furious when I called it a raid). Thus I lack the credentials to contest Ran Baratz’s all-out condemnation of the past several IDF chiefs of staff. I want only to note that instead of the usual accusation that these generals have tried to refight the last war, Baratz condemns them for wanting to fight a future post-modern war.
Nor do I have any documents to disprove his contentions, having gathered none in my three visits to Israel since October 7, during which I only chit-chatted with staff officers and saw only one very minor combat action involving just three M109 self-propelled howitzers supporting infantry combat—as well as a single F-16 strike, and that too only coincidentally.
But of course I do know that the IDF entered the war with fewer reserve brigades than in the past, and too few for concurrent all-out action in both Gaza and Lebanon, because the generals he mentions failed to resist the force reductions by threatening to resign in public protest, let alone actually resigning. But I do challenge the accusation that they failed to resign because they were hypnotized by postmodern fantasies as Ran Baratz would have it. There was another motive: they wanted to acquire some other capabilities for the IDF.
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