The Peace Process Failed, but Its Bad Assumptions Live On

Shany Mor’s essay identifies four “concepts” that he believes blinded us to the approaching disaster of October 7. The first is what he sees as Benjamin Netanyahu’s tendency to inertia, the second is the political project of religious settlers, the third is the lingering effect of the “peace process,” and the last the warped structure of political sovereignty in Gaza by which outside powers take financial responsibility for the well-being of the population, freeing the actual rulers to concentrate on terrorism.

Of the four, the third, which points to the faulty logic of the so called “peace process,” is, I think, most convincing—which is why the second, blaming religious settlers, is the least so. Many Israelis feel October 7 vindicated the settlers: had we not evacuated the Gaza Strip in 2005 none of this would have ever come about. That’s a hard point to dispute.

That said, Mor’s insight into the lingering effects of the defunct peace process is profound. Not the process itself, but the frame of mind that animated it, continues to inform Israeli, American, and European actions—political, administrative, and military—in unexpected ways; it even informs the actions of the peace process’s opponents.